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1. Introduction
In Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s story “The Adventure of Silver Blaze”
Sherlock Holmes asks himself why the dog was not barking that
night when the crime was committed in the house of the dog’s
owner. The answer of this question proves to be the key to the crime
mystery (it was the owner of the dog who committed the crime!).
Similarly to Mr. Holmes’ bewilderment, a puzzling counterfactual
question lies in the core of this study: why no substantial reforms
have taken place in policy areas like education in recent years in
Bulgaria, despite the common popular and expert’s perception that
this is a sphere in desperate need for profound visionary reforms.
And why, at the same time, policy areas like ecology – an area
about which Bulgarian citizens show little concern - are being re-
formed, re-regulated, and the budgetary resources allocated to them
have multiplied in recent years? What causes this distortion in the
logical policy–making chain that consists of ‘problem identification
– public and expert pressure for policy intervention – identification
of policy measures – reform implementation’? Only when relating
this puzzling question to the fact that six years ago Bulgaria entered
the European Union (EU) accession process, one could get closer to
solving this policy-making mystery.
This paper aims to identify the relation between the intensive EU
rules, regulations and acquis-transfer that takes place in certain
policy areas during the EU accession process, and the non-reforms
in other policy areas. The starting hypothesis is that the failure of
many accession countries’ governments to seriously deal with the
problems in the non-EU regulated policy areas is a perverse effect
of the accession process itself. The effects of the accession process
and the procedures it involves on the way policy priorities are being
articulated on the nation-state level is studied here. Do we observe a
twist in the way politicians define what the key problems they need
to address are? If ‘domestic policy problems’ start being named by
the European accession agenda, do the non-regulated policy areas
automatically become ‘problem-free areas’ in the eyes of the politi-
cians? This research shows that the fact that EU harmonizes certain
policy areas and leaves others on the discretion of the national gov-
ernments has a perverse effect on the non-EU regulated areas.
There are hardly any ‘technical spillovers’ and ‘soft Europeaniza-70 European Political Economy Review
tion’ taking place in the non-EU regulated areas. Rather, they re-
main abandoned, unreformed and anachronistic, even in the case
that there is strong domestic demand for their reform.
Although this research is based on the case of Bulgaria, it develops
a model for establishing the presence of this reverse effect of EU
accession, which can be applied to further country-cases of the last
enlargement wave, and of the further enlargements. We expect that
the effect observed here is common to the post-communist triple
transition countries (Offe 1991). The simultaneity of the triple tran-
sition that these countries were going through in the 90s – self-
determination (nationhood), the democratic institutions building
(constitutional order) and the ‘normal politics’ (economic liberali-
zation, and political representation) - was already unique and un-
precedented. And yet a fourth dimension was to be added to it - the
process of European integration, which involved partial renounce-
ment of sovereignty to a supranational governance level. This study
aims to show that when exercised in ‘triple transition countries’, the
process of European integration can have a perverse effect on the
quality of democratic governance and policy making.
This research naturally places itself within the growing literature on
the specificities of the last enlargement wave in Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE). Authors like Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2002,
2004, 2005), Dimitrova (2002), Dimitrova and Rhinard (2005), An-
donova (2005), Grabbe, (2002) and Vachudova (2001, 2005) have
developed in recent years nuanced and rich theoretical frameworks
for the understanding of the transformative power and of EU in
CEE and the mechanisms of EU rule transfer. The literature how-
ever strangely misses the chance to look at EU enlargement from
yet another perspective: how does the changing nature of policy
making in an ‘EU accession regime’ influence the policy making in
spheres that are not directly regulated by the EU? How does the
‘external conditionality rule’ alter the value systems, loyalties and
incentive structure of accession countries’ politicians? Does the
emergence of a new center (EU and its institutions) change the way
‘public interest’ is being defined by the accession countries’ gov-
ernments? These are the questions that form the center of this study.Gavrilova: The Other Side of European Integration 71
2. Placing the research into the EU-enlargement studies con-
text
In the last decade, a new key question has emerged in the field of
EU-studies, around which a growing in volume and richness body
of literature emerges: “How European integration affects the acces-
sion countries of the most recent EU enlargement wave?” The body
of literature that analyzes the effects of EU accession on the candi-
date -member countries is asking the question how the external in-
fluences and conditionality rules imposed by the EU throughout the
accession process interact with domestic conditions   to produce
domestic  change,  adjustment,  reform  and  institution  building
(Schimmelfennig  2004; Schimmelfennig  and  Sedelmeier 2002,
2004; Dimitrova 2002; Andonova 2005, Grabbe 2002); how is
compliance with the EU rules achieved (Vachudova 2005); how so-
cialization and learning takes place; what is the role of the ‘misfit’
of policy standards between member countries and accession coun-
tries (Börzel and Risse 2000).
“The effectiveness of EU’s active leverage stems from its passive
leverage – from the benefits of membership (and the cost of exclu-
sion)” (Vachudova 2005:259) The threat of withdrawal of the
membership prospect assures compliance by the candidate states.
The author observes that the credibility of the future membership
influences societies and political elites to take such decisions and
policies that firmly put the states on the path to liberal democracy.
Vachudova (2005) identifies three mechanisms that encourage post-
communist EU accession countries to comply with the extremely
complex and massive requirements that are put on them through the
accession preparation process: conditionality, credible commitment,
and influence on domestic groups.
In their concluding chapter to a book dedicated to the study of the
external incentives model of EU-governance in CEE, Schimmelfen-
nig and Sedelmeier (2005) summarize the distinct features of the
process. They distinguish two phases of conditionality developed by
EU in respect to CEE states - democratic conditionality which is
predominantly used in the first stage of EU membership prepara-
tion, and acquis conditionality which is enforced as CEE countries
enter the full membership preparation process. They define the
membership negotiations as a process of massive rule transfer that72 European Political Economy Review
triggers compliance on behalf of the future member states by the
promised reward of EU membership. Moreover, they show that en-
largement, and the acquis adoption requirement that the process
entails, are the main conditions for effective EU rule export to the
region. In the absence of the EU conditionality and the EU member-
ship promise, ruling elites would not necessarily adopt EU rules
where their adoption is costly or inconvenient. Schimmelfennig and
Sedelmeier emphasize that any study of the post-communist transi-
tion in CEE that does not include the impact of the EU integration
process, would be incomplete and provide a distorted picture of the
way transition is happening. An important contribution is the recog-
nition that EU rule in CEE differs from the ‘network governance’
that is characteristic for the way the European community functions
internally. In CEE the EU rule is rather hierarchic, vertical, and in-
volves command and control and steering. A top-down nature of
rule transfer in the enlargement process is described as its key fea-
ture.
An important effect of the EU external governance in CEE is its
impact on institution building. Dimitrova (2002) defines institution
building as the central pillar of the EU strategy towards candidate
states of the last wave of enlargement, as working institutions are a
necessity for the successful implementation of the acquis. Dimi-
trova argues that the overwhelming accession conditionality of the
EU leaves little space for domestic actors to exercise their vetoes,
and warns that the institutions that are being created through “EU
rule import” might not take deep root if the domestic preferences do
not converge towards reform and if the ideas underpinning the rules
are not clear enough to suggest an easily adoptable institutional
model.
The growing literature on the specificities of 'enlargement East'
strangely  fails  however  to  look  at  the  wider  effects  of  EU-
conditionality on policy making in non-EU regulated policy areas. It
is precisely this issue that this study is focusing on.
There is yet another stream of literature that has been developed far
away from the subject of European studies, but that bears some
relevance to my research. In the last decade scholars concerned with
economic development in transition countries, with ethics of gov-
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ture’ (Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann 2000). The term refers to “the
capacity of firms to shape and affect the formation of the basic rules
of the game (i.e. laws, regulations, and decrees) through private
payments  to  public  officials  and  politicians”  (Hellman  et.  al.
2000:2). The phenomena is being observed in many transition
economies, where captor-firms obtain from public officials rent-
seeking opportunities, that generate private benefits for them, such
as higher profits, sales growth, etc. Hellman et. al. show that the so-
cial costs of state capture for all other firms in the transition econo-
mies can be considerable, as the negative externalities for non-
captor firms in high capture economies are significant. “Moreover,
the success of captor firms in securing individualized protection for
their property rights appears to weaken overall progress in strength-
ening the security of property rights for all other firms” (Helman et.
al. 2000:5).
As we progress through this study, we will inquire whether we
could speak of a kind of ‘benevolent state-capture effect’ of the
European integration on policy-making in countries of the most re-
cent EU enlargement wave.
And finally, Thomas Diez (1999) argues that the way we conceptu-
alize the European Union is not an innocent act – different discur-
sive approaches to the new ‘political creature’ bring to the fore dif-
ferent parts of its characteristics, and thus determine our perception
of what the EU is. An insight that should raise my cautiousness
when I propose a re-conceptualization of the EU enlargement ef-
fects on the CEE countries in transition.
3. Research design
For the purpose of this study, the research is limited to the single
case of Bulgaria - a post-communist transition country, which is
still in the EU accession process, and is characterized by relatively
weak governance and a rather large ‘misfit’ (Boerzel and Risse
2000) between European standards and domestic practices in most
policy areas. Although it is obvious that a larger number of country-
based cases would have strengthened the reliability of the conclu-
sions that will be drawn here, time pressure and data availability74 European Political Economy Review
prevented us from extending the research to other countries –
something that remains an agenda for the future. What is done here
is the development of a research design that could serve as a 'tem-
plate' for further research on the perverse effects of EU accession in
the CEE transition countries. An attempt to conceptualize the find-
ings in a way that makes them a basis for further region-wide com-
parative research is also undertaken.
We propose a grid in which one could place every policy-making
area in order to describe whether each of them is subject to weak or
strong EU pressure for reforms and weak or strong domestic pres-
sure for reforms. Most interesting are the cases where there is a dis-
crepancy between the EU and domestic pressure for reforms. In this
paper we look at education and ecology in Bulgaria in the period
after the start of the EU accession process, to the present day. We
look at the policies of the Bulgarian governments towards   these
two policy areas since the start of the accession process. In other
words, different aspects of government intervention in them – leg-
islative, regulatory, and financial, are analyzed. We attempt to es-
tablish how much these policy areas has been a priority during this
period by comparing the level of reforms that each of the sectors
has undergone and the level of state funding allocated to it. At the
same time, we account for how high the pressure for reform was,
and what were the sources of this pressure – was it the EU institu-
tions, or the domestic citizens and expert community. Analyzing
this data allows us to conclude  what - in the context of EU acces-
sion - drives policy prioritization and innovation: is it the pressure
for reforms that is being exercised by the institutions of the EU, or it
is the domestic voters’ demand and domestic experts identification
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Education and ecology policy areas are tested here on:
1) how high reforms in the given policy are at the EU accession ne-
gotiations agenda
2) how much reforms are seen as necessary by the local citi-
zens/voters
3) how much legislative and re-regulatory work affecting these
policy areas was going on in the accession negotiations period
4) how much the state budget allocated for these policy areas was
being increased/decreased
5) how much there was a change in the patterns of government fi-
nancing for the two policy areas
The hypothesis that is being tested is that in the context of EU-
accession negotiations in CEE countries, the priorities that are on
the EU agenda become the domestic priorities as well. Domestically
formulated policy priorities – be it by popular or expert consensus -
do not matter any more, they are overshadowed by the totality of
the EU-integration meta-agenda. As a result, key policy areas (like
education for example) that fall outside the focus of EU-attention
because of the very nature of the evolution of the Union, fall out of
the attention of domestic governments as well, which gravely af-
fects society as a whole, and the development of concrete policy ar-
eas and the country as a whole.
If the data collected shows a clear correlation between EU-priorities
and domestic reforms, while showing discrepancy between domes-
tically formulated priorities (opinion polls, expert analysis) and re-
forms, we will be getting closer to proving the hypothesis, or oth-
erwise disproving it. Identifying a clear correlation between EU-
pressures for reforms and actual reforms that are taking place how-
ever is still not convincingly showing a causal relationship. This is
why we use interviews with experts and policy-makers in the two
policy areas, in order to add the ‘insider’s point of view’ on what
was and is today driving the reforms in the areas that the interview-
ees were observing or actually reforming while being part of recent
governments.76 European Political Economy Review
In the center of this research there is a single case study. Several
qualitative research methods are used - document analysis (new
legislation, budgets, EC accession progress reports and other rele-
vant documents), opinion polls, expert analysis and semi-structured
interviews. If analysis of legislative acts, documents and opinion
polls show correlation between EU pressure for reforms and actual
reforms and policy attention, interviews are used in order to estab-
lish whether a causal relationship exists between them as well.
4. The Policymaking Distortion Puzzle
This chapter reviews the empirical data collected for this study, and
tests the research   hypothesis that the failure of many accession
countries’ governments to seriously deal with the problems in the
non-EU regulated policy areas is a perverse effect of the accession
process itself.
4.1 The Education Policy Puzzle
An opinion poll conducted by Alpha research agency in March
2002 shows that 67 % of Bulgarians perceive education as one of
the highest priorities for the country. When asked “Which are, ac-
cording to your opinion, the highest priorities for Bulgaria today?”,
Bulgarians outline seven top priorities. Economic development,
successful fighting of crime and health reform come first with 96%,
92% and 82 % of the answers respectively. Political stabilization
and improvement of the education system are seen as equally im-
portant (68% and 67 %). Last in the top priorities list, according to
the poll, are the Euro-integration of Bulgaria and the NATO mem-
bership. Asked to name those priorities that are “second-rank”, and
“not so important”, Euro-integration and NATO membership come
up first.
A poll conducted in December 2002 by Alpha Research shows the
criticism of Bulgarians towards the achievements of the government
in the field of education. When asked to assess the policy of the
government in ten different policy areas, education is put at the very
bottom of government achievements, equal only to culture (9% sat-Gavrilova: The Other Side of European Integration 77
isfaction with the policies in each of the two areas). Only the criti-
cism of government policies in the field of healthcare and fighting
unemployment and poverty (80 % and 77 % correspondingly) is
higher than the criticism of the education policy (76% critical atti-
tude). When asked to name the five top priority policy areas to
which the limited state resources should be directed, Bulgarians
(Alpha Research, December 2002) rank education fourth in the top
priorities list, preceded only by fighting unemployment (72%),
healthcare (70%), and crime (58%).
When asked to name the five problems that most of all affect their
family and them personally (Alpha Research, December 2004),
problems in education come as a second concern, just after street
crime and burglaries. When asked which areas require accelerated
reforms (Alpha Research, March 2005) Bulgarians point out Edu-
cation as fourth in the list of top priorities (out of eleven), with 40%
of the answers, preceded only by the healthcare system (68%), judi-
ciary system reform (57%), and interior affairs and fighting crime
(55%).
A TNS-BBSS Gallup survey of the public opinion on education
(March 2006) confirms the tendency outlined in the above cited
surveys. When asked to assess whether education in Bulgaria de-
velops positively or degrades, 52% say that education is in decline
and worsening, while only 8% think that it is developing positively.
When asked to identify with one of the two opinions: “Despite
problems, the Bulgarian educational system is good enough, but
needs higher levels of state financing” or “Bulgarian primary and
secondary education needs a profound and total reform, because of
the new needs of today” 25% identify with first, and 45% identify
with the second statement. This makes a majority that think that the
education system needs either more government investment, or pro-
found reforms, i.e. needs more government attention.
Looking at this data, one would expect that at the beginning of the
21st century education would be amongst the highest priorities of
Bulgarian governments: that the state budget finances allocated to it
would grow, twinned by visionary reforms that fix the deficiencies
of the education system and offer a clear perspective for its devel-
opment.78 European Political Economy Review
According to a study of the Center for Economic Development
however (2005), Bulgaria has the lowest ratio in Europe of primary
education spending as a percentage of GDP: 0,6 in 1999 and 0,7 in
2001, and is at the bottom of spending ratio for the secondary edu-
cation (1.2 in 1999 and 1.7 in 2001). According to data offered by
the Ministry of Education and Science (IME website 2006), spend-
ing on education is fluctuating around the 210 million BGN level in
the period 2002 – 2005, with marginal ups and downs, but no
growth. (Figure 1)
Figure 1: Ministry of Education and Science spending on education, BGN
Data source: Institute for Market Economies
The government spending levels indicate that education has failed
to become a priority for the government in recent years. Can it be
that the visionary reform of the education system that was outlined
as an urgent need in the opinion polls has taken place through opti-
mization of the schooling system, while funding levels remained
unchanged? The legislative activities in education deny this pre-
sumption. Most of the legislative acts that address individual as-
pects of the education system have been adopted before the public
concern with education reform became a top priority for Bulgarian
citizens (something that happened around the turn of the century),
and have not been producing the change that is needed. The Law on
People’s Education was adopted in 1991, and was subsequently
amended several times. According to the Center for Legislative Ini-
tiatives (CLI) analysis of the legislative framework of secondary
education (2005), the reasons why the law was amended so often
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were the absence of a clear vision about where education should go.
Law amendments were not sufficiently thought through, and the
frequent change of ministerial teams, as well as the lack of interest
of the government and parliament in the real needs of society as
concerns education contributed to messy legislation-making.
The Law on Level of Education, the Educational Minimum and the
Teaching Plan was adopted in 1999 and aimed at regulating the
teaching plans according to which education is being conducted.
The law however lead to double legislation in certain areas which
deepened the problems rather than clearing the issues it addressed
(CLI 2005). The Law on Professional Education and Teaching,
adopted in 1999, addressed issues concerning the organization, the
institutions, the governance and financing of the professional edu-
cation system. A sophisticated law, it did not however create an
adequate system that would address the needs of the labour market.
Today, key problems like the optimization of the schools network
stay unaddressed, which has lead to chaotic and fragmented actions
of reorganization and closing of schools throughout the country
(Panayotov 2005).
In sum, the legislative acts concerning the educational system that
have been adopted in recent years (most of them prior to 2000, the
year when, according to an educational expert interviewee a popular
consensus on the need for profound reform of the educational sys-
tem emerged, and incidentally, the year of start of the EU member-
ship negotiations for Bulgaria) do not show an effort on behalf of
the government for a visionary reform in education. Rather, the
partial legislative acts and sub-acts have complicated, if not wors-
ened the situation of education. According to an educational expert
interviewee, “the one and only profound change in the field of edu-
cation took place in the beginning of the 1990s, when the ideologi-
cal fundament inherited from the communist times was taken out of
the educational programs and new textbooks were produced”.
Several expert analyses (CLI, 2005; Panayotov, I, 2005; CED,
2005) underline the reform deficiency in the field of primary and
secondary education in Bulgaria. “In fact the only sphere in which
hardly any reforms were taking place was the educational system of
Bulgaria.” (CED, 2005:1)
So here is the educational policy puzzle: why is it that despite the
striking consensus among society and education experts alike that
primary and secondary education in Bulgaria is in a deep crisis -80 European Political Economy Review
and in need of profound reforms that should concern all aspects of
the educational system (its financing, minimal standards, teachers’
qualification and so on) - only marginal attention has been paid to
this policy field by all of the Bulgarian governments in recent
years? Why is it that despite the fact that the per capita resources
allocated to education are comparatively very low, they have not
been increased? Can the difficult economic situation of the country
and the lack of resources be blamed for this? And where was gov-
ernments’ attention going instead?
4.2 The Environmental Policy Puzzle
According to an Alpha Research opinion poll (December 2002),
ecology fails to rate amongst the five highest priority policy areas
for Bulgarian citizens. While education ranks fourth, ecology takes
the seventh of ten positions, thus occupying the low end of the peo-
ple’s perception of where governments should put efforts on order
to better the life of citizens. Further polls conducted by Alpha Re-
search (September 1999, February 2001, February 2003, December
2004, September 2005, April 2006) continuously put ecology at the
bottom of public concern, with percentages varying between 5 and
20, depending on how the question was formulated, and whether the
questions was open or closed.
If politicians were being elected in order to respond to the public
concerns and demands of their fellow citizens, one would expect
that ecology would not be a priority area for Bulgarian governments
in recent years. And yet, if growth of budget allocated to certain
policy area and the number of legislative changes concerning it is
an indicator for the prioritization of the policy areas, and a signal of
reforms that are taking place, one could conclude that ecology has
become a concern and a priority area for several Bulgarian govern-
ments in a row. The data available for the period since 2002 shows
that the absolute spending of the Bulgarian Ministry of Ecology and
Waters has been rising steadily. (Figure 2)Gavrilova: The Other Side of European Integration 81
Figure 2: Ministry of Environment and Waters spending, BGN
























Data source: Institute for Market Economies
The comparison of the growth of spending in the two policy areas
discussed so far is telling. The government spending on education,
which since 1999/2000 has clearly become a first-rank priority for
the citizens of Bulgaria, and a shared concern of educational experts
alike, is hardly growing, whereas the spending for ecology – a sub-
ject of little concern for Bulgarians in the same period, is growing at
a substantial rate (Figure 3).
Figure 3: Spending growth (%), Education and Ecology compared
Data source: Institute for Market Economies
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Unlike the case of education, most of the legislative acts concerning
ecology in Bulgaria were adopted in the years after 2000. Their
number significantly exceeds the number of legislative acts in the
field of education. In 2002 the Law for Protection of Environment
has been adopted, the Law on Biological Diversity has been voted
in 2002, Law on Hunting and Game Protection in 2000, Law on
fishing and aquacultures in 2001, Medicinal Plants Act in 2000,
Law on Protection Against the Harmful Impact of Chemical Sub-
stances and Preparations in 2000, and each of these laws has been
amended several times thereafter (including the Clean Air Act in
2000, 2001 and 2003). A number of government strategies ad-
dressing particular environmental issues were adopted (e.g. Bul-
garian HCFC Phase-out strategy, 2003), and public awareness rais-
ing campaigns were conducted by the government. Five regulative
acts were adopted in the period, concerning the structure and func-
tions of the Ministry of Environment (1999, amended 2006), the
structure and functions of the Executive Environmental Agency
(2000, amended 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006), the structure
and activities of the Enterprise in charge of managing activities on
environmental protection (2003), the structure and activities of the
Regional Environmental Inspectorates (2004) and concerning the
structure and activities of the Directorates on Water Basins (2002).
A network of country -wide Ecology Information Centers was es-
tablished in 2001, a High Expert Commission on Ecology at the
Minister of Ecology and Waters was constituted in 2004, Expert
Committees on Ecology were established at the Regional Ecology
Inspectorates in 2004, and a public register of the experts entitled to
offer ecological assessments was created in 2003. A complex set of
Regulations – over hundred and fifty of them - concerning the qual-
ity of air, waste management, water quality, nature protection, in-
dustrial pollution and waste management, chemicals and GMO, as
well as noise were adopted in the years after 2000 (see Ministry of
Environment and Waters web site).
This brief review of the government legislative, regulatory and
public awareness raising activities in the years since 2000, twinned
with the data on the growth of the state budget allocations for ecol-
ogy allow us to see that ecology has become a definite priority for
the Bulgarian government in recent years. One can only wonder
how policy area prioritization within subsequent Bulgarian govern-
ments is taking place, given that - if we accept Hanna Pitkin’s defi-Gavrilova: The Other Side of European Integration 83
nition (1967) of political representation, to represent means to
“make present again”, i.e. to make citizens' concerns and perspec-
tives “present” in the public policy-making processes. What we
have observed here is a major distortion of the logic of representa-
tion: being amongst the highest concerns for the population and ex-
perts, education is not becoming a government priority, whereas
ecology – a policy area that is hardly a concern for Bulgarian citi-
zens (despite the state-supported awareness-raising campaigns) - is
becoming a clear government priority. Where could the cause of
this policy making distortion lie? Is it that Bulgaria was approach-
ing an ecological catastrophe, and although the population did not
care, the government took responsible action? This is definitely not
the case: with the early transition deindustrialization of the country
and the environment protection measures that the country started
implementing already in the 1990s, at the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury the environmental situation in Bulgaria was actually improving
(European Environment Agency, 1998:186, 215, 254, 258).
4.3 EU Accession as a Key Explanatory Variable for the Policy-
making Distortion Puzzle
What seems a more viable explanation of the policy-making distor-
tion is the effect of the EU accession negotiations on the way policy
areas are being prioritized by the government. Bulgaria entered the
EU accession negotiations in January 2000 – a process that can only
metaphorically be called ‘negotiations’, as for the last wave of en-
largement candidate-member states, EU accession was a rather
asymmetrical process of policies adoption, driven by the EU acquis
conditionality. As Heritier (2005: 207) has put it, the process of
Eastern enlargement is a ‘one way street’, i.e. the states that aspire
membership are not invited to take part in shaping the policies of
the Union. It is a ‘take it all or leave it at all’ type of game.
As a future EU member, Bulgaria had to adopt a massive number of
acquis, regulations and standards in most policy areas. The different
level of regulation by the EU of different policy areas - the fact that
in policy areas like ecology or justice and home affairs the acquis-
adoption and reform demand is very high, whereas policy areas like
education and culture are defined as areas of exclusive competence
of the member states, puts a different volume of demands on differ-
ent policy areas in accession countries. And as EU membership be-84 European Political Economy Review
comes a political meta-aim number one for these countries, all state
efforts and resource are put in force in order to satisfy the demands
of the EU institutions, and to ‘deserve’ the so much desired mem-
bership.
A brief review of the acquis requirements and the attention paid to
each of the policy areas discussed here in the Commission moni-
toring reports will give us a clear idea of the different level of pres-
sure exercised by the EU on different policy areas along the acces-
sion negotiations process.
The environment policy acquis consists of over 200 major legal acts
that concern the horizontal legislation, quality of air and water,
waste management, nature protection, industrial pollution control
and risk management, chemicals and GMO, and noise and forestry.
Compliance with the acquis requires significant investment, and a
strong and well-trained administration at national and domestic
level.
Education, like training and culture, is a policy area left to the com-
petence of the Member States. The only positive integration tools
developed by the EU in these areas are funding programs like
Leonardo da Vinci, Socrates, Erasmus, with the aim to assist col-
laboration amongst member states. The requirement put on the
member states in these areas is to show that they have a sufficient
implementing capacity, in order to ensure appropriate financial
management of the education, training and culture programs.
The monitoring reports are the tool of the Commission to exercise
pressures for compliance and timely alignment with the EU acquis.
The Roadmap for Bulgaria and Romania of 2002 (Commission of
the European Communities 2002) provides a long list of concrete
measures to be taken by the Bulgarian government and institutions
concerning ecology in short-, mid–, and long-term. The notes on
education are much more concise: the main concern expressed is
that Bulgaria should improve its financial management capacity as
regards participation in the EU educational programs, as well as
provide adequate provisions for the education of migrants’ children.
Like all of the Commission Monitoring Reports preceding it, the
2003 Regular Report (Commission of the European Communities
2003) offers a long and detailed critical review of the institutional
achievements and current problems in ecology, as well as an agenda
for reforms. In contrast, as concerns education, the only recommen-
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education of the children of migrants in Bulgaria (a persistent criti-
cism that is not highly relevant for Bulgaria, which is not yet an
immigrant country…).
The October 2004 regular report (Commission of the European
Communities 2004)  presses for further government investment in
ecology, in order to allow for successful alignment with the EU ac-
quis, adoption of legislation, and the creation of new implementa-
tion structures. The report names individual areas within the envi-
ronment policy sphere where more measures need to be adopted.
The conclusions of the 2004 regular report regarding Education is
very similar: no problems are expected in complying with the re-
quirements in the field, and indeed good progress and achievements
are reported.
The following April 2005 report on the negotiation results (Com-
mission of the European Communities 2005a) accounts for the
achievements in each policy area i.e. in each negotiating chapter
concerning the alignment with EU acquis and regulations. The part
on Education consists of one line: “Bulgaria and Romania will take
over and implement the acquis under this chapter as to the date of
accession”. The report on Chapter 22 (Environment) is four pages
long, accounts in details about the already achieved and lists a series
of concerns.
The October 2005 monitoring report (Commission of the European
Communities 2005b) does not mention education, while it concen-
trates on several problematic areas in ecology. Areas of concern
remain concrete issues like the integrated pollution prevention and
control, implementation of waste management legislation and hori-
zontal ecological legislation.
And finally, the May 2006 monitoring report mentions ecology with
the requirement to improve the horizontal legislation, water quality,
integrated pollution control, etc. Education is not a concern for this
report.
The above shows clearly: since the beginning the EU accession ne-
gotiations (2000), Bulgaria has been a subject of persistent pressure
for concrete reforms, acquis implementation, growing budget allo-
cations, and achievement of standards in one of the policy areas de-
scribed here (ecology), whereas only a marginal pressure has been
exercised in the other - education.
Could this strong correlation between the priority given by the EU
institutions to certain policy areas and the state budget spending on86 European Political Economy Review
them be a coincidence? Or is it a sign that in Bulgaria the EU acces-
sion process has brought with itself the replacement of the domestic
priorities with those articulated by the EU?
To answer these questions, we should look beyond budget data, as it
is not the sole sign of prioritization by the state. In the ‘triple transi-
tion’ context, the volume of strategizing efforts and reforms in cer-
tain policy areas is another indicator of whether a policy area is pri-
oritized or not. What we have found out so far is that there is a clear
correlation between the resources and reform efforts that are being
put by the Bulgarian government in different policy areas and the
fact that the EU has or has not developed acquis in these policy ar-
eas. Regardless of the popular public opinion that defines invest-
ment and reform in particular policy areas as an urgent need, the
government spending and reform effort goes with the policy areas
where there is a pressure to adopt acquis and achieve certain EU
standards that would allow Bulgaria to become member of the EU.
4.4 An EU-Accession Perverse Effect?
The correlation discovered so far does not however give us a con-
vincing enough reason to conclude that there is a causal relation-
ship, i.e. that the EU accession requirements while fostering devel-
opment and reform in some policy areas, backfire and produce a
perverse effect of neglect in those areas where there are no EU ac-
quis. To discover whether such causal relationship existed, we in-
terviewed policy makers that have been part of the high level gov-
ernment  administration,  as  well  as  experts  that  have  observed
throughout the years the policy making in each of the four policy
areas. The aim was to find out was how far their knowledge of the
policy making processes would confirm my hypothesis that indeed
within the EU accession process the policy priorities of the EU be-
came policy priorities of the Bulgarian governments, and as a result
the  non-EU  regulated  policy  areas  remained  abandoned,  unre-
formed, and anachronistic.
The  interviews  overwhelmingly  confirmed  the  hypothesis  that
throughout the accession process, the policy areas where there is
EU acquis and demands for reform, automatically become priority
of the Bulgarian government, whereas the rest of the policy areas
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Virtually all interviewees agreed that since the start of the EU ac-
cession negotiations in Bulgaria the demands imposed by the nego-
tiations process became ‘The Driving Force’ of any reforms that
have been carried trough. When asked if he thinks that the priorities
of the EU affect the domestic priorities, AB answered: “But we do
not have other priorities! We do not have a capacity to develop
such!” VG explained the ‘lightness’ of the EU standards ‘internali-
zation’ by the political elite with the fact that in the transition pe-
riod, EU an NATO membership have become uncontested highest
priority mega-goals for the country. In areas where pressures for re-
forms are high, such as justice and home affairs, reforms are in-
spired by Europe, aimed at the ‘European standard’ – however illu-
sive the concept, and by the accession process itself that involves
intensified communication with European experts [DS interview].
MD also agreed that to a large extent education has been marginal-
ized by policy makers in recent years because of the lack of EU
minimal standards and acquis in this field, and because of the do-
mestic lever ‘EU accession determined policy making environment’
that is defined by the acquis adoption requirement.
Moreover, the interviewees saw that the myth of the ‘European de-
mand’, ‘European pressure’ and ‘European standards’ have been
used to legitimize any reform actions, regardless whether they are
really demanded by the EU or not. RG pointed this ‘effect’ as im-
portant sign of the shift in policy making prioritization in favour of
the ‘European demand’. DS pointed out that although in the field of
justice and home affairs there is EU pressure to achieve certain
standards of law enforcement, there is no one prescribed model, and
the expectation is that Bulgaria would discover the most appropriate
institutional arrangement for its judicial system. Despite of that fact
however, Bulgarian politicians and other policy makers created the
“myth of the European standards”, with which every reform is le-
gitimized. The same was noted by the educational expert inter-
viewed [MD]: “As much as any reforms strategies are being intro-
duced, they are always legitimized with ‘the European standards”.
But there are no such standards in education. If there were such, re-
forms would have been easier.”
A particularly interesting observation was made by RG, who noted
that different parts of the administration, even within the same
Ministry, were working at different speeds and with different effi-
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issues, or were part of the ‘regular business’ of the administration.
In the ministry where she was deputy-minister, far more attention
was paid to the few little areas where there was something to regu-
late in order to ‘close the chapter’ in comparison to any other part of
the activities of the same Ministry. The administration miraculously
worked well when it came to fulfilling the EU requirements – ex-
pert committees were being   formed, documents prepared, dis-
cussed, sent, revised, etc., while the same ministry did close to
nothing in all other areas of its regular activity. There was no one to
set strategy for action, aims, priorities, goals and deadlines for this
‘business as usual’ part of activities of the administration.
 VG noted a similar phenomenon: with the start of the EU integra-
tion process, and the formation of euro-integration departments
within the individual ministries, these new departments become
more important than the others. The best trained specialists were
transferred to the new units, which weakened the rest of the admini-
stration apparatus.
There are several possible explanations of the twisting effect of EU
accession on the policy making and policy prioritization in the ‘ac-
ceding’ country. Interviewees spoke about the lack of ability of the
state to formulate its own priorities. VG saw a total lack of policy
making capacity in the Ministry of education for example. He
pointed out that not only EU, but the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) also leaves behind education and culture: the two most im-
portant foreign factors for the internal policy making in the country
are both not interested in education and culture… DS pointed out
that there was a lack of a center that would be able to offer a clear
vision for a profound and total reform of the judicial institutions.
AB was convinced that there is a policy-making deficiency and lack
of administrative capacity throughout the government administra-
tion. The administration is asked to elaborate policies, but it does
not have capacity to do that. This is why, he thought, politicians and
the administration alike easily internalize the priorities of EU, but
also of IMF for example, and make them our own government’s
priorities. AP pointed out that the Commission has stated in several
of its monitoring reports on the progress of Bulgaria towards EU
accession that except of the areas where EU policies exist, Bulgaria
lacks  mechanisms  for  policy  development and  implementation
(European Commission 2005 Comprehensive Monitoring Report on
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The burden with the massive law transfer and requirements that take
away the limited administrative capacity of the state was another
explanation offered. MD pointed out that the alignment with the EU
acquis and regulation ‘sucks’ social energy, and there is little en-
ergy left in the government for systematic approach to non-EU re-
lated problems.
But can we not expect that the EU-driven modernization on some
policy area will sooner or later produce spillovers to the non-
regulated policy areas? RG saw such spillovers only on the level of
rhetoric. In most policy areas the predominant rhetoric has become
“Europe-flavoured”, but not much more is happening where there in
to pressure to ‘Europeanize’… AB saw only marked-driven spill-
overs, e.g. the pressure of the Employers’ Union for changes in the
school curriculum which would produce the specialists that econ-
omy today needs.
To conclude, the interviewees overwhelmingly recognized the ex-
istence of a perverse effect of the EU accession requirement on the
policy making and prioritization of the Bulgarian government. They
agree that the distortion caused by it affects negatively the non-EU
regulated policy areas.  They pointed out however one dangerous
political consequences of this ‘perverse effect’, namely the erosion
of trust in the domestic policy maker’s capacities. As AP reminded
me, the Eurobarometer data in recent years persistently shows an
‘authority gap’ - Bulgarians highly trust the EU institutions, and
distrust the national institutions.
We therefore have convincing indications that the correlation dis-
covered in the data between the levels of prioritization, reform, and
funding of certain policy areas and the levels of pressure for re-
forms exercised by the EU within the accession negotiations proc-
ess, is not a coincidence. There is a causal relationship – more pres-
sure for reforms coming from the EU makes certain policies a pri-
ority for Bulgarian government, on the expense of those areas that
are of no concern of the European Union.
Conclusion: EU – The Benevolent State Captor
The EU enlargement literature agrees that the acquis conditionality
exercised by the EU is having a transformative power in the CEE
states that aspire EU membership: it triggers institution building,90 European Political Economy Review
policy reform and innovation, and the achievement of common
European standards in those policy areas where the EU has assumed
competence for common policies enforcement. In EU-regulated
policy areas, governments set strategic goals and plans for the
achievement of those, propose new legislation that is being adopted
by parliaments, set up new institutions and allocate state budgets
that are growing in size each year. However, based on empirical re-
search of the case of Bulgaria, this study has shown that as EU inte-
gration becomes meta-objective for the EU-candidates, and the de-
mands imposed by the accession process become overwhelming,
the policy prioritization by the future member states’ governments
gets perverted. The requirements set by the accession negotiations
become internalized by domestic politicians as equivalent of the
policy problems their countries face. The negative side-effect of this
substitution is that policy areas where EU has no competence and
does not set requirements for reform, become neglected by national
governments, with consequences that are sometimes harshly dam-
aging for society.
Several factors have been identified that explain why this policy
prioritization shift and the resulting neglect of the non-EU regulated
policy areas take place.
First of all, EU membership was seen by most transition countries
in CEE Europe as uncontested political objective number one – an
act that would decisively define the geopolitical belonging of these
countries, would crone their transition efforts, and would secure
their growing prosperity. Ninety percent of the accession negotia-
tions, however, take place not between the Candidate State and the
Commission but within the country. This is how EU membership as
a geopolitical and foreign policy priority number one is silently
transformed into a set of EU-required national level policies that
bear highest priority internally.
Secondly, the administrative burden of the acquis adoption re-
quirement on the accession countries is so big that is sucks the ex-
pertise and implementation capacity of the government institutions
and the administration and little energy is left for the formulation of
priorities and policies beyond those already spelled out by the EU.
In the course of the accession negotiations, each new member state
had to translate 90000 pages of acquis, and to implement them into
their national legislation. The state administration started working
on two speeds with the EU-departments of Ministries taking theGavrilova: The Other Side of European Integration 91
best prepared experts and workers, leaving the rest of the admini-
stration to cope with the human resource that is left available after
the EU-accession related tasks are allocated.
Thirdly, as the interviews conducted for this research have shown,
the administration of Bulgaria – a ‘triple transition’ candidate
country - did not manage to transform itself and professionalize
prior to the beginning of the accession process. Its capacity to for-
mulate own needs and policies stayed rather law, and the little that
was there was put on hold by the more important goal of achieving
EU membership.
The perverse effect of the EU accession negotiations process on the
policy prioritization and policy making in CEE is a phenomenon
with significant consequences.
First of all, as a result of the distorted policy making ‘accession
mode’ important policy areas like education are being neglected,
which leads to deterioration of the quality of the education offered
to Bulgaria’s children. The impact of the growing number of chil-
dren that do not go to school and the worsening standards of educa-
tion received by those who do attend on economic development and
social cohesion is devastating.
Secondly, the easy replacement of domestic mechanisms for policy
prioritization with the adoption of ready-made EU policy prescrip-
tions erodes the popular trust in domestic policy – makers’ capaci-
ties. European institutions become significantly better trusted than
domestic ones, a fact that signals disappointment with the domestic
political elites, governments, and their administration.
Thirdly,  the  accession  process  erodes  democratic  institutions.
Jakoby (2004: 4) cites telling figures that are typical for all the ac-
cession countries, including Bulgaria: “In Hungary in June 1999
parliamentary session, of the 180 laws passed, 152 were not subject
to any debate simply because they were part of the EU acquis com-
munautaire.” Democracy ‘accession mode’ seems to accept the deg-
radation of key institutional pillars of the democratic system to
technical units stamping decisions taken elsewhere
Last but not least, the very principle of political representation gets
distorted: voters elect politicians with the hope that they will be ad-
dressing their concerns and finding solutions to the problems that
press them, whereas once elected, politicians start responding ex-
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of the policy-making agenda in the CEE accession countries by the
EU regulative agenda, although invited and welcomed, bears simi-
larities with the state-capture phenomenon. As in the classical state-
capture case, in an EU accession environment, the responsiveness
of the government to the interests of the citizens is being distorted,
as the government puts them aside for the benefit of a non-elected
actor. The difference is that in the classical state capture case the
captor is bribing the government to secure policies that are in his
personal interest, whereas the EU imposes rules that should be of
the interest of the future member state citizens’. Still, as concerns
the CEE accession countries, the negative side effect of the state
capture remains present, and, we have labelled EU ‘a benevolent
state captor’.
What is the significance of this accession-triggered policy-making
distortion? After all, once the last two CEE countries become mem-
bers of the EU, this policy making distortion would disappear, to-
gether with the significantly diminished demands for common EU
rule adoption. The significance of the effect discovered in this re-
search is highly relevant for those countries that are still in the line
for EU membership. It would probably even be more significant in
the case of Macedonia, Croatia, Serbia, Albania or even Turkey
than it was for Bulgaria, as the negotiations with these countries are
expected to take longer than they have taken in the case of Bulgaria
and the rest of the countries of the most recent wave of enlarge-
ment. If the observed policy distortion in the field of education
lasted for the seven years of Bulgaria’s accession negotiations, the
effect of a twice or three times as long policymaking distortion that
would let education in these countries fall lower in government’s
priorities could be even more harmful. Its degree of harm would de-
pend on the administrative capacities developed by these countries
prior to the start of the accession process.
This research has several limitations. Analyzing a single case study
is not an ideal research design. It would be interesting to develop
the study, comparing data on Romania (most similar case to Bul-
garia), Hungary (a CEE country with one of the firmest democratic
policymaking traditions prior to the start of the EU accession nego-
tiations), and Albania (a country that it not yet set on the EU-
membership track). Comparing these three additional country-cases
would strengthen the reliability of my conclusions and would allow
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effect of the European integration process in CEE. Adding further
policy areas where EU and domestic demand for reforms go in dis-
sonance would strengthen the study.
A comparative study on the topic would allow for theoretical en-
richment of the definition of the policy effect discovered here. How
will achieving EU membership affect the policy innovation capaci-
ties of the new member states? Will the political representation
distortion be undone? How do different CEE accession countries
react to the benevolent state capturing effect of the accession proc-
ess? What are the factors that determine the degree to which a ne-
glect of non-EU regulated policy areas is taking place?
Still, this study has already opened a new venue for research of one
aspect of Euro-integration that has been overlooked by scholars till
now. It is a necessary contribution to the body of literature that ex-
plores  the  conditionality  determined  transformative  power  of
Europe  in  CEE  (Schimmelfennig  2004;  Schimmelfennig  and
Sedelmeier 2002; 2004; Jakoby 2004; Dimitrova 2002; Andonova
2005; Grabbe 2002; Vachudova 2005). It describes a harmful side-
effect of the accession process on policy making in the candidate
states – the other side of all the positive social transformation ef-
fects, already thoroughly studied in the literature on ‘Europeaniza-
tion East’. The claim put forward here is that we could not obtain a
satisfactory understanding of the complexity of the EU-driven East
European transformation, without studying its shady sides as well.94 European Political Economy Review
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